“GLOCALIZATION” OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION—
RETHINKING TRADITION: MODERNITY AND EAST-WEST BINARIES
THROUGH EXAMPLES OF CHINA AND JAPAN
Kun Fan *

In the main streams of comparative law, general legal theory
and the study of globalization, there is a general lack of consideration
of non-Western legal experience. Such general omission is deeply
rooted in the static binaries such as “tradition-modernity” and
“East-West,” which make up ‘legal Orientalist’ discourses. This
article fills the gap by studying the case China and Japan and
analyzing the role of their tradition on the contemporary development
of international arbitration. Through the specific example of
international commercial arbitration, it illustrates that even in
specialism where “national identity” seems relatively weak, and thus
the effects of globalization is particularly strong, local culture
remains to play a significant role.
Rejecting the cultural homogenization thesis, this article puts
forward the theory of “glocalization of arbitration,” which describes
the entanglement process between “global standards” and “local
norms” in international arbitration. The concept of glocalization is
used to analyze the ways in which social actors construct meanings,
identities, and institutional forms within the sociological context of
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globalization conceived in multidimensional terms. On the one hand,
global norms are localized with adaptations to accord more closely
with local cultures—“localized globalism;” on the other hand,
through interactions with different cultures, local practices may
produce shared norms and expectations, which will in turn shape
behaviors and eventually form a common culture—“globalized
localism.” It challenges the conventional world view of traditionmodernity, West and non-West, and proposes a different way to look
at modernity or in fact a “postmodern” framework, which can be
characterized as an age of “glocalization.”
After the Introduction, Part II maps the conceptual framework
of culture and defines the two notions of legal culture. Part III takes
a microscopic approach to illustrate localized globalism by looking
at the local cultures in China and Japan and analyzing the cultural
influence on their respective contemporary arbitration regimes. Part
IV attempts to foresee whether the cross-national interactions in the
arbitration community will lead to a convergence of the participants’
own national legal cultures and eventually lead to the emergence of
a common international arbitration culture crossing national and
geographical boundaries—the “diffusion of cultures” and
“globalized localism.” Part V concludes with a few observations on
the limits of this study and possible areas for future research.
“It bids us remember benefits rather than injuries, and
benefits received rather than benefits conferred; to be
patient when we are wronged; to settle a dispute by
negotiation and not by force; to prefer arbitration to
litigation — for an arbitrator goes by the equity of a
case, a judge by the strict law, and arbitration was
invented with the express purpose of securing full
power for equity.”
Aristotle, Rhetoric 1

1

ARISTOTLE, Rhetoric bk. I:13 (W. Rhys Roberts trans., Dover Publications
2004) (c. 350 B.C.E.).
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“Lead them by political maneuvers, restrain them with
punishments: the people will become cunning and
shameless. Lead them by virtue, restrain them with
ritual: they will develop a sense of shame and a sense
of participation.”
The Analects of Confucius 2
I.

Introduction

We live in the world of globalization, 3 which allows us to
cross space and time, to be informed of what happens around the
world within seconds, to engage with people in other parts of the
world as if they were just next door, and to travel regularly for
business or leisure at an affordable cost. The old geographical
boundaries that distinguish sharply between “local,” “national,”
“regional,” and “global” no longer work in a complex, networked
world where these boundaries overlap and interpenetrate each other.
At the same time, norms, principles, standards, laws, and legal
institutions are circulated among national systems and spread from
the national to the global level, and vice versa. This process is often
described as “globalization of law” or “legal globalization.” 4 Against
2

CONFUCIUS, The Analects of Confucius 6 (Simon Leys trans., W.W. Norton &
Company 1997) (c. 500 B.C.E.).
3
Scholars hold divergent views as to the definition of globalization, as well as its
scale, causation, chronology, impact, etc. Some core qualities of globalization
can be identified, such as the creation of new social networks and activities and
the multiplication of existing ones; the expansion and the stretching of social
relations, activities and interdependencies; the intensification and acceleration of
social exchanges and activities; and change of the subjective plane of human
consciousness. For a discussion, see DAVID HELD & ANTHONY MCGREW,
GLOBALIZATION/ANTI-GLOBALIZATION (2d ed. 2007); DAVID HELD & ANTHONY
MCGREW, GLOBALIZATION THEORY (2007); JAMES H. MITTELMAN, THE
GLOBALIZATION SYNDROME (2000); SASKIA SASSEN, A SOCIOLOGY OF
GLOBALIZATION (2007); THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW
(Jens Drolshammer & Michael Pfeifer eds., Kluwer Law International 2001);
THEORISING THE GLOBAL LEGAL ORDER (Andrew Halpin & Volker Roeben eds.,
2009); Alexandra Crampton, Addressing Questions of Culture and Power in the
Globalization of ADR, 27 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 229 (2006).
4
See, e.g., DAVID HELD & ANTHONY MCGREW, GLOBALIZATION/ANTIGLOBALIZATION (2d ed. 2007); DAVID HELD & ANTHONY MCGREW,
GLOBALIZATION THEORY (2007); WOLF HEYDEBRAND, From Globalisation of
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the background of social change in globalization, law loses its
autonomy becoming “porous” and open-ended. 5
To be sure, within the legal sphere, different specialties will
be affected by globalization in different ways, depending on whether
they are already transnational in character and whether they deal with
specifically global issues. 6 In other words, the key issue is “the
cultural embeddedness of the area of law” 7 or what I will call “the
degree of national identity.” In certain areas of law, where national
identity or cultural embeddedness is particularly strong, legal
transplantation from one country to another may be extremely
difficult. Accordingly, the effects of globalization may be less
obvious. For instance, family law touches on deep questions of
religion and culture, so family law transfers are less likely to take
place. In other areas of law of a transnational nature or which deal
with overtly global issues, legal transplantation may be readily
available and a worldwide convergence of the law and practice may
be already emerging. Commercial law is one such area of law.
Businessmen respond to relatively universal profit incentives
embedded in markets, and commercial transactions do not touch on
the core issues of personal behavior. 8 Therefore, commercial law is
generally more amenable to transfer across borders than family law.
Similarly, the common interests of merchants have driven the

Law to Law under Globalisation, in ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES (David Nelken
& Johannes Feest, eds., 2001); THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE PRACTICE OF
LAW (Jens Drolshammer & Michael Pfeifer eds., Kluwer Law Int'l 2001); MARC
GALANTER, The Modernization of Law, in MODERNIZATION: THE DYNAMICS OF
GROWTH 153 (Myron Weiner ed., 1966); JOHN GILLESPIE, Developing a
Framework for Understanding the Localisation of Global Scripts in East Asia, in
THEORISING THE GLOBAL LEGAL ORDER 209 (Andrew Halpin & Wolker Roeben
eds., 2009); PATRICK GLENN, Cosmopolitan Legal Orders, in THEORISING THE
GLOBAL LEGAL ORDER 25 (Andrew Halpin & Wolker Roeben eds., 2009);
WILLIAM TWINING, Implications of 'Globalisation' for Law as a Discipline, in
THEORISING THE GLOBAL LEGAL ORDER 39 (Andrew Halpin & Wolker Roeben
eds., 2009); WILLIAM TWINING, GLOBALISATION AND LEGAL THEORY (2000).
5
WILLIAM E. SCHEUERMAN, Globalisation and the Fate of Law, in RECRAFTING
THE RULE OF LAW 243 (David Dyzenhaus ed., 1999);
6
TWINING, Implications of 'Globalisation' for Law as a Discipline, supra note 4,
at 39.
7
TOM GINSBURG, Lawrence M. Friedman's Comparative Law, in LAW, SOCIETY,
AND H ISTORY: ESSAYS ON THEMES IN THE LEGAL SOCIOLOGY AND LEGAL
HISTORY OF LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN (Robert W. Gordon ed., 2010).
8
See Id. (Using banking law as an example).
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convergence of the national arbitration system and the substantial
harmonization of the law and practice in international arbitration.
In line with globalization of law, there is a strong movement
towards the harmonization of the law and practice of international
commercial arbitration worldwide. The United Nations, in particular
its Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), has made
an essential contribution to the process of legal harmonization. 9 The
instruments for the international unification of domestic laws include
the following:
•
International conventions: the New York
Convention, 10 adopted in 1958 and now recognized by 149 States and
non-state territories. 11 The New York Convention is “the most
successful multilateral instrument in the field of international trade
law.” 12 Nations signing the Convention must take two fundamental
promises: first, to honor an agreement in writing under which the
parties agree to privately arbitrate disputes, concerning a subject
matter capable of settlement by arbitration; 13 and second, to recognize
and enforce awards made in arbitrations that are within the scope of
the Convention, unless the award is tainted by one of the exhaustive
grounds listed in Article V of the Convention. 14 It is these promises
that provide an “additional measure of commercial security for
parties entering into cross-border transactions.” 15
•
Model laws: the UNCITRAL Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration of 1985 with Amendments as
9

See GEROLD HERRMANN, UNCITRAL's Basic Contribution to the International
Arbitration Culture, in ICCA CONGRESS SERIES NO. 8 49-52 (Albert Jan van den
Berg ed., Klewer Law Int'l 1996).
10
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (1958) [hereinafter New York Convention],
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/XXII_1_e.pdf.
11
For a complete list of signatures of the New York Convention, see New York
Convention Status, UNCITRAL,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_statu
s.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2016).
12
PIETER SANDERS, Foreword by Pieter Sanders as Honorary General Editor, in
ICCA'S GUIDE TO THE INTERPRETATION OF THE 1958 NEW YORK CONVENTION: A
HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES (Int'l Counc. for Com. Arb. 2011) [hereinafter ICCA
Guide].
13
New York Convention, supra note 10, art. 2.
14
New York Convention, supra note 10, art. 5.
15
SANDERS, supra note 12, at xi.
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Adopted in 2006 (Model Law). 16 Although the Model Law does not
take the form of a treaty, legislators who have decided to review their
arbitration legislation have all “given due consideration” to the Model
Law, as recommended by the United Nations General Assembly. 17 It
“forms the basis for States without an arbitration law to adopt one
ready-made or to substitute it for one that is out of date.” 18 Other
jurisdictions “have enacted new legislation, which … is based
essentially upon the Model Law.” 19 There are now sixty-eight States
and non-state territories that have adopted or adapted the Model
Law. 20
•
Contractual technique: one common example is
where a standard dispute resolution clause referring to the use of
internationally recognized rules for the conduct of dispute resolution
proceedings could be included in a contract. The UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules (as amended in 2010) 21 is an example of such
internationally recognized uniform rules.
16
The Model Law was adopted by the UNCITRAL on June 21, 1985, at the end of
the 18th Session of the Commission. It was amended by UNCITRAL on July 7,
2006, at the 39th Session of the Commission. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON
INTERNATIONAL COM. ARB., U.N. Sales No. E.08.V.4 (U.N. COMMISION ON INT’L
TRADE L. 2006) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law].
17
The General Assembly, in its resolution 40/72 of December 11, 1985,
recommended “that all States give due consideration (emphasis added) to the
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, in view of the desirability of
uniformity of the law of arbitral procedures and the specific needs of international
commercial arbitration practice.” Subsequently, the General Assembly, in its
resolution 61/33 of December 4, 2006, recommended “that all States give favorable
consideration to the enactment of the revised arts of the UNCITRAL Model Law
on International Commercial Arbitration, or the revised UNCITRAL Model Law
on International Commercial Arbitration, when they enact or revise their laws …”
See EMMANUEL GAILLARD & JOHN SAVAGE, FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN ON
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRARTION 109 (John Savage & Emmanuel
Gaillard eds., Kluwer L. Int'l 1999).
18
ICCA Guide, supra note 12, at xi.
19
Id.
20
For a list of jurisdictions whose legislation is based on the Model Law, see
Status: UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985),
with amendments as adopted in 2006, UNCITRAL,
www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_sta
tus.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2016).
21
Effective on 15 August 2010, see UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES (AS
REVISED IN 2010) (U.N. COMMISION ON INT’L TRADE L.),
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-revised/arb-rulesrevised-2010-e.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2016).
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The above instruments have been the major forces pushing
towards the unification of arbitration law and arbitration rules. As a
result, international consensus has been reached with respect to a
number of procedural issues. There are many examples of points of
convergence, as argued by Kaufmann-Kohler, such as separability of
the arbitration agreement, 22 the principle of competencecompetence, 23 limited remedies against the award, and party
autonomy. 24 In this context, modern arbitration is developing towards
an ever-increasing global harmonization. 25 This trend has been
referred to as the development of “transnational arbitration,” 26 or
sometimes labeled as an “arbitral legal order.” 27
Americanization of International Commercial Arbitration?
Many scholars believe that Western influence, and in
particular American influence, remains dominant in the development
of international arbitration. This phenomenon is often described as
“Americanization of international commercial arbitration.” 28 In
22

The principle that the validity of the arbitration agreement is independent from
the validity of the main contract. This is also referred to as “severability” or
“autonomy” of the arbitration agreement. See GAILLARD & SAVAGE, supra note
17, at 198-217; MARTIN HUNTER et al., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 117-21 (2009); PIERRE MAYER, The Limits of
Severability of the Arbitration Clause, in ICCA Congress Series no. 9 261-67
(ALBERT JAN VEN DEN BERG ed., 1999).
23
The principle that an arbitral tribunal has the power to rule on its own
jurisdiction. This principle enables the arbitral tribunal to continue with the
proceedings even where the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement is
challenged. See SAVAGE & GAILLARD, supra note 17, at 73.
24
Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Globalization of Arbitral Procedures, 36 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1313 (2003).
25
For discussions about the points of convergence, see Id.
26
See generally, KAUFMANN-KOHLER, supra note 24, at 1313-1333; Marc
Blessinglessing, Globalization (and Harmonization?) of Arbitration, 9 J. INT'L ARB.
79 (1992); Fali Nariman, East Meets West: Tradition, Globalization and the Future
of Arbitration, 20 ARB. INT'L 123 (2004).
27
For a discussion on the evolution and usage of the expression “arbitral legal
order”, see EMMANUEL GAILLARD, ASPECTS PHILOSOPHIQUES DU DROIT DE
L’ARBITRAGE INTERNATIONAL 60-66 (2008).
28
See, e.g., WILLIAM PARK, AMERICANIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
AND V ICE VERSA ARBITRATION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DISPUTES: STUDIES
IN LAW AND PRACTICE (2006); Roger Alford, The American Influence on
International Arbitration, 19 OHIO. ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 69 (2003); Eric
Bergsten, The Americanization of International Arbitration, 18 PACE. INT'L. L.
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Dealing in Virtue, the authors describe the increasing influence of
“Anglo-American law firms” in international arbitration and the
“offensive brought by the American lobby . . ., to rationalize the
practice of arbitration such that it could become offshore-U.S.-stylelitigation.” 29 The rise of the “American law firm model” is leading to
“a more aggressive and confrontational style of litigation, displacing
the earlier Continental
model
of the pipe-smoking
professor/arbitrator with his ‘oracle of the law’ mode of producing
As Karamanian explains,
courtroom legitimacy.” 30
“‘Americanization’ suggests international arbitration is akin to
dispute resolution in the United States. For some non-Americans, the
observation has normative consequences; it means unbridled and
ungentlemanly conduct or a strategy of “total warfare.” 31
The claims of Americanization of international arbitration are
in line with the general assumption of the Westernization of law. In
the context of legal globalization, Watson proposes that fixed
preferences about global scripts compete in a “marketplace” of ideas.
From an economic perspective of this competition, he estimates that
global scripts generally prevail over local opposition because they are
promoted and resourced by legal elites. Watson sees few points of
interaction between the global and local, making legal globalization
relatively easy. Watson uses his many examples of legal transplants
to show the ease and inevitability of legal transfers. 32 Following this
REV. 289 (2006); Elena Helmer, International Commercial Arbitration:
Americanized, "‘Civilized," or Harmonized?,19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 35
(2003-2004); Susan Karamanian, Overstating the "Americanization" of
International Arbitration: Lessons from ICSID, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 5
(2003-2004); PEDRO MARTINEZ-FRAGA, THE AMERICAN INFLUENCE ON
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENTS AND
DISCOVERY METHODS (2009); George von Mehren & Alana Jochum, Is
International Arbitration Becoming Too American?, 2 GLOB. BUS. L. REV. 47
(2011); Lucy Reed & Jonathan Sutcliffe, The ‘Americanization’ of International
Arbitration?, 16 MEALEY'S INT'L. ARB. REP. 36 (2001); Nicholas Ulmer, A
Comment on "The 'Americanization' of International Arbitration?", 16 MEALEY'S
INT'L. ARB. REP. 24.
29
YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL
LEGAL ORDER 51-57 (1996).
30
AMR A. SHALAKANY, Arbitration and the Third World. A Plea for Reassessing
Bias Under the Specter of Neoliberalism, 41 HARV. INT'L L. J., 419, 435 (2000).
31
Karamanian, supra note 28, at 5, 6.
32
Alan Watson, Comparative Law and Legal Change, 37 CAMBRIDGE L.J., 313
(1978).
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line of arguments, globalization has become a “Western discursive
orthodoxy,” 33 which equals globalization as global Westernization. It
is often assumed that as a result of the competition in the marketplace
of ideas, Western traditions, ideas, and modern laws will dominate in
the process of globalization. They see globalization as a marvelous
contribution of Western civilization to the world.
However, the impact of the Western modern law was
critically questioned by some recent historical and anthropological
This article challenges the general assumption of
studies. 34
Westernization of law andthe claims of the Americanization of
international arbitration in particular. Through the specific example
of international commercial arbitration, it illustrates that even in
specialism where national identity seems relatively weak, and thus
the effects of globalization is particularly strong, local culture
remains to play a significant role.
Furthermore, in the main streams of comparative law, legal
theory, and the study of globalization, there is a generally little
consideration of non-Western legal experience, even though some
excellent and highly relevant work on the East Asia region has been
done. 35 Such general omission is deeply rooted in static binaries such
as “tradition-modernity” and “East-West,” which make up “Legal
Orientalist” 36 discourses. As Ruskola points out, “Orientalism refers
33
Erik Swyngedouw, Globalisation or 'glocalisation'? Networks, territories and
rescaling, 17 CAMBRIDGE REV. OF INT'L AFF., 6 (2004).
34
See, e.g., STUART BANNER, HOW THE INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND: LAW AND
POWER ON THE FRONTIER 5-9 (2007) (examining the acquisition of Indian
property through contracts, treaties, and other means); NICHOLAS BLOMLEY, Law,
Property, and the Geography of Violence: The Frontier, the Survey, and the
Gribid., 93 ANNALS OF THE ASS'N OF AM. GEOG. 121 (2003) (arguing "that
violence plays an integral role in the legitimation, foundation, and operation of a
regime of private property."); TEEMU RUSKOLA, LEGAL ORIENTALISM: CHINA,
THE UNITED STATES, AND MODERN LAW (2013); ADAM SELIGMAN & ROBERT
WELLER, RETHINKING PLURALISM: RITUAL, EXPERIENCE, AND AMBIGUITY 10
(2012) (suggesting boundaries should not be absolutized, but acknowledged in a
sense of genuine pluralism); ROBERT WELLER, ADAM SELIGMAN, MICHAEL
PUETT & BENNETT SIMON, RITUAL AND ITS CONSEQUENCES: AN ESSAY ON THE
LIMITS OF SINCERITY 11 (2008) (criticizing "the particularisms of Western
Europe and of the United States").
35
See ANDREW HARDING, Comparative Law and Legal Transplantation in South
East Asia: Making Sense of the 'Nomic Din', in ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES 199
(DAVID NELKEN & JOHANNES FEEST eds., 2001).
36
RUSKOLA, supra note 34.
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to the way Europe has historically defined itself against ‘Oriental
Others’. Legal Orientalism, in turn, refers to the way the West
defines what is and is not law in terms of the system used by the
‘Oriental Others’ who are perceived not to have law.” 37 According
to this view, the East is often framed as lawless by virtue of its
differences from the West. Such perception is based upon a
misunderstanding of world history, which draws essentially on
European history, a misunderstanding of earlier societies, and a
misunderstanding of our current situation. 38
Globalization has stimulated a revival of old debates between
universalism and cultural relativism. As Twining points out, “how
can one seriously claim to be a universalist, if one is ethnocentrically
unaware of the ideas and values of other belief systems and
traditions?” 39 Dipping a Western spoon into the river of Oriental
history can only give us some one-sided pieces. This article attempts
to understand the legal traditions in China and Japan by taking into
consideration elements of both cultures such as the value placed on
harmony and specific features of interpersonal relationships. Based
on this understanding, this article will then analyze the influence of
tradition on the contemporary development of international
arbitration. The examples of China and Japan may shed light on the
interactions between globalization of law and divergence of local
cultures. This article challenges the conventional world view of
tradition-modernity, West and non-West, and proposes a different
way to look at modernity: a ‘postmodern’ framework thatcan be
characterized as an age of ‘glocalization.’
Glocalization
Rejecting the cultural homogenization thesis, this article puts
forward the theory of “glocalization of arbitration,” which describes
the entanglement process between “global standards” and “local
norms” in international arbitration. The term “glocalization”
appeared for the very first time in the nineties in a sociological review
carried out by Japanese scholars who used the Japanese word
37

Id. at 40.
For critiques of the static binaries of “tradition-modern” and “West-NonWest”,
see HARDING, supra note 35, at 199; RUSKOLA, supra note 34; SELLER &
WELLER, supra note 34.
39
TWINING, Implications of 'Globalisation' for Law as a Discipline, supra note 4,
at 39.
38
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dochakuka. TheJapanese business community often used the term to
refer to marketing issues, as in the popular slogan “think globally, act
locally.” 40 It was later brought to the attention of the sociological
community by Roland Robertson, who defined it as “the
simultaneity—the co-presence—of both universalizing and
particularizing tendencies” and “the tempering effects of local
conditions on global pressures.” 41 Arguing that cultural globlization
always takes place in local contexts, Robertson speaks of
“glocalization” to capture the essence of the complex interaction of
the global and local characterized by cultural borrowing. 42
The glocalization theory can address some of the perceived
problems of globalization. Critics of have argued that globalization
has caused conflicts between an emerging worldwide system of
values and regional autonomy, resulting in the destruction of local
cultures. 43 The glocalization theory proposes to mediate the conflicts
between the global and the local, and contends that “rather than being
totally obliterated by the Western consumerist forces of sameness,
local difference and particularity still play an important role in
creating unique cultural constellations.” 44
The forces of globalization and those of localization are “two
sizes of the same process in which the global is brought in
conjunction with the local, and the local is modified to accommodate
the global.” 45 This article argues that the development of arbitration
is a hybrid blended and creolized process of glocalization. On the
one hand, global processes are incorporated into the local setting—
“localized globalism” or “micro-globalization.” On the other hand,
40

B. KUMARAVADIVELU, CULTURAL GLOBALIZATION AND LANGUAGE
EDUCATION 45 (2007).
41
ROLAND ROBERTSON, Glocalization: Time-space and HomogeneityHeterogeneity, in Global Modernities (MICHAEL FEATHERSTONE ET AL eds.,
1995); ROLAND ROBERTSON, GLOBALIZATION: SOCIAL THEORY AND GLOBAL
CULTURE (1992).
42
ROLAND ROBERTSON, Glocalization: Time-space and HomogeneityHeterogeneity, in Global Modernities (MICHAEL FEATHERSTONE ET AL eds.,
1995); ROLAND ROBERTSON, GLOBALIZATION: SOCIAL THEORY AND GLOBAL
CULTURE (1992). For further discussion on the theory of glocalization, see also
SWYNGEDOUW, supra note 33, at 45-48.
43 CHARLES LERCHE, THE CONFLICTS OF GLOBALIZATION 3(1) IJPS (1998).
44
MANFRED STAGER, GLOBALIZATION: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 75-76
(2009).
45
KUMARAVADIVELU, supra note 40, at 45.
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local ideals, practices, and institutions are also projected onto global
scenes—“globalized localism” or “macro-localization.” 46 Rejecting
the hegemony of the globalization thesis, this article argues that the
alleged process of Westernization should be re-cast as a process of
“glocalization.”
Part II maps the conceptual framework of culture and defines
the two notions of legal culture. Part III takes a microscopic approach
to illustrate localized globalism by looking at the local cultures in
China and Japan, and analyzes the cultural influence on their
respective contemporary arbitration regimes. Part IV attempts to
foresee whether the cross-national interactions in the arbitration
community will lead to a convergence of the participants’ own
national legal cultures, and eventually lead to the emergence of a
common international arbitration culture that crosses national and
geographical boundaries—the “diffusion of cultures” and “globalized
localism.” Part V concludes with a few observations on the limits of
this study and possible areas for future research.
II.

Mapping the Conceptual Framework Of Culture

Even though procedural rules are becoming more
standardized and less country-specific, expectations of process differ
based on the cultural background of the parties or arbitrators. To use
an analogy, the two impressionists Camille Pissarro and Paul
Cézanne often painted and drew side-by-side, yet each was keen to
demonstrate his own personality. From their paintings on the same
subject, we can clearly observe two paths, and two very different
ways of thinking about painting. 47 This is comparable with arbitrators.
When exercising the broad procedural powers, two different
arbitrators, influenced by their own cultural background, may paint
46

See BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARDS A NEW COMMON SENSE: LAW,
SCIENCES AND POLITICS IN THE PARADIGMATIC TRANSITION 65 (1995).
47
A Series of Colored Patches, Museum of Modern Art,
http://www.moma.org/explore/conservation/cezannepissarro/colored_patches.htm
l (last visited Feb. 26, 2016). New York’s Museum of Modern Art held an
exhibition of two such works by Cézanne and Pissarro from June 26, 2005 to
September 12, 2005 titled “Pioneering Modern Painting: Cézanne and Pissarro
1865–1885.” This exhibition offered an unprecedented opportunity to examine
the parallel creative paths of these two artists, both through their common choices
of subject matter and through their intense engagement in exploring new pictorial
processes.
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the arbitration proceedings differently, similar to Pissarro and
Cézanne.
For instance, American arbitrators generally do not have the
same approach to discovery as French arbitrators, and Italian
arbitrators who have extensive arbitration experience are likely to
adopt a different approach to the proceedings than Italian arbitrators
who are mainly trained as a municipal court judges. The parties and
their lawyers, similarly, always expect what they are familiar with to
be the norm. For instance, Anglo-American parties and their lawyers
will most likely expect a highly adversarial approach, whereas Asian
parties and their lawyers will expect an inquisitorial and conciliatory
approach. Kaplan thinks the cultural attributes of counsel are often
more crucial than that of the client and notes that “one could take the
same dispute and have it tried with two different sets of lawyers and
end up with two completely different arbitrations with perhaps two
differing results.” 48 This influence of the cultural attributes of
arbitrators, counsels or lawyers is often implicit and sometimes
unconscious. However, one cannot overlook culture and its role in
shaping institutional design and its influence on the process and even
on the outcome of the arbitration.
What is culture anyway? Culture has many different
meanings. For anthropologists and other behavioral scientists,
culture is the full range of learned human behavior patterns. The term
was first used in this way by the pioneering English Anthropologist
Edward B. Tylor, who wrote: “Culture or Civilization, taken in its
wide ethnographic sense, is that complex whole which includes
knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities
and habits acquired by man (sic) as a member of society”. 49 In the
20th century, “culture” emerged as a central concept in anthropology,
encompassing the range of human phenomena that cannot be directly
attributed to genetic inheritance. In sociology, culture is considered
as the ways of thinking, ways of acting, and material objects that
together shape a people's way of life. For instance, the German
sociologist Georg Simmel defines culture as “the cultivation of
48

Neil Kaplan, Arbitration in Asia--Developments and Crises (Part 2), 19 J. Int’l
Arb.3 (2002), at 255.
49
EDWARD TYLOR, THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE, PRIMITIVE CULTURE:
RESEARCHES INTO THE DEVELOPMENT OF MYTHOLOGY, PHILOSOPHY, RELIGION,
ART, AND CUSTOM, at 1 (LONDON, CAMBRIDGE LIBRARY COLLECTION,
1871).
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individuals through the agency of external forms which have been
objectified in the course of history.” 50
Williams claimed that “culture is one of the two or three most
complicated words in the English language.” 51 This paper does not
intend to trace out the full range of the different meanings of culture
used in the academic discourse. We can, however, attempt to
conceptualize the term from the following fundamental aspects:
A.

The Concept of Culture in Two Fundamental Aspects

In one meaning, culture is “a theoretically defined category or
aspect of social life that must be abstracted out from the complex
reality of human existence.” 52 In this usage, culture is contrasted with
some other equally abstract category of social life, such as economics,
politics, or history. Culture in this sense, as an abstract theoretical
category, only takes a singular meaning. 53
In its other meaning, culture refers to “a concrete and bounded
world of beliefs and practices. Culture in this sense is commonly
assumed to belong to or to be isomorphic with a ‘society’ or with
some clearly identifiable subsocietal group.” 54 In this sense, the
contrast is not between culture and other non-cultural categories of
social life, but between one culture and another—between Chinese,
American, and French cultures. 55
Culture as a theoretical category is conceptualized in
numerous ways. The dominant concept in American anthropology
since the 1960s considers culture as a system of symbols and
meanings. 56 This conceptualization is to “disentangle the semiotic
influences on action from the other sorts of influences—demographic,
geographical, biological, technological, economic, and so on . . . .” 57
50

GEORG SIMMEL, ON INDIVIDUALITY AND SOCIAL FORMS xix (1971).
RAYMOND WILLIAMS, KEYWORDS: A VOCABULARY OF CULTURE AND SOCIETY
87 (1983).
52
WILLIAM SEWELL, LOGICS OF HISTORY: SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION 156 (2005).
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
See, e.g., CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 85-125, 193233 (1973) (describing the term “cultural system”); DAVID SCHNEIDER,
AMERICAN KINSHIP: A CULTURAL ACCOUNT (1968).
57
SEWELL, supra note 52, at 160.
51
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Over the last two decades, there has been a return to the concept of
culture as practice, 58 suggesting Bourdieu’s key term “practice” 59 as
an appropriate label by which to understand culture. Scholars in this
camp insist that culture is a space of practical activity, subject to
struggle, contradiction and constant change. I tend to think that the
two schools of thought are not necessarily at odds with each other.
Indeed, system and practice are not contradictory but complementary
concepts. As Sewell suggested, “to engage in cultural practice means
to utilize existing cultural symbols to accomplish some end. . . .
Hence practice implies system. But it is equally true that the system
has no existence apart from the succession of practice that instantiate,
reproduce, or—most interestingly—transform it. Hence system
implies practice.” 60
B.

The Two Notions of Legal Culture

Friedman is credited with introducing the concept in the legal
context to make explicit “the unofficial, and what otherwise would
have been thought of as non-legal, behaviors as nonetheless
important for shaping what is more conventionally understood as
legal.” 61 He identified three central components of the legal system:
(a) the social and legal forces that, in some way, press and make “the
law”; (b) “the law” itself―structures and rules; and (c) the impact of
law on behavior in the outside world. 62 According to Friedman,
“where ‘the law’ comes from and what it accomplishes—the first and
third terms—are essential to the social study of law.” 63
Friedman should be credited to introduce the concept of “legal
culture.” He defined legal culture as “those parts of general culture –
58

See e.g., JAMES CLIFFORD & GEORGE MARCUS, WRITING CULTURE: THE
POETICS AND POLITICS OF ETHNOGRAPHY (1986); Sherry Ortner, Theory in
Anthropology since the Sixties, 26 COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN SOCIETY AND
HISTORY 126 (1984).
59
PIERRE BOURDIEU, ESQUISSE D'UNE THÉORIE DE LA PRATIQUE [Outline of a
Theory of Practice] (1972).
60
SEWELL, supra note 52, at 164.
61
Susan Silbey, Legal Culture and Cultures of Legality, in HANDBOOK OF
CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY 471 (John Hall et al. eds., 2010).
62
LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE 2
(New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1975).
63
Id, 15.
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customs, opinions, ways of doing and thinking – that bend social
forces toward or away from the law and in particular ways.” 64 To
advance a social scientific study of “law in action,” Friedman used
the concept of legal culture as a means of emphasizing the fact that
law was best understood as a product of social forces, and itself a
conduit of those same forces. 65 Since the introduction of the concept,
debates have arisen among scholars. Cotterrell is one of the most
sustained critiques of the concept. He questioned the role of using the
concept of legal culture in explanatory inquiry, and warned us against
assuming that the various units of legal culture make up a unity. 66 He
insisted that “[e]verything about law’s institutions and conceptual
character needs to be understood in relation to the social conditions
which have given rise to it. In this sense law is indeed an expression
of culture.” 67
These debates point to the complexities of legal culture and
the controversies plaguing the concept of culture generally. Despite
the fact that culture is a “vague and fuzzy concept,” 68 and is often
“not the sole or even necessarily the prime determinant of
behavior,” 69 many scholars find the concept useful as a means of
understanding aspects of legal action that are “not confined to official
legal texts, roles, performances or offices.” 70 Culture is considered
“a powerful, inescapable force shaping all aspects of human conduct,
including adjudication.” 71 For the purpose of analysis in this article,

64

Id, 15.
Id, 16..
66
Roger Cotterrell, The Concept of Legal Culture, in COMPARING LEGAL
CULTURES (David Nelken ed., 1997); see also, ROGER COTTERRELL, LAW,
CULTURE AND SOCIETY: LEGAL IDEAS IN THE MIRROR OF SOCIAL THEORY 82
(2006) (reflecting on problems in using culture as an explanatory concept in
theoretical analyses of law); Roger Cotterrell, Culture, Comparison, Community,
Culture, 2 Int'l Journal of Law in Context 1 (2006) (arguing that legal studies
today must have a comparative dimension, and that they should contribute to an
understanding of law in relation to culture, or as a cultural phenomenon).
67
ROGER COTTERRELL, The Sociology of Law: An Introduction 26 (2nd ed. 1992).
68
GLEN FISHER, INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION: A CROSS-CULTURAL
PERSPECTIVE 7 (1982).
69
Joshua Karton, International Arbitration Culture and Global Governance, in
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: CONTENDING
THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 84 (Walter Mattli & Thomas Dietz eds., 2014).
70
Silbey, supra note 61, at 471.
71
Karton, supra note 69, at 11.
65
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I will adopt the two notions of legal culture proposed by Tom
Ginsburg. 72
The first notion of legal culture relates to those aspects of
national or regional culture that “find expression in the legal
system.” 73 It “points to differences in the way features of law are
themselves embedded in larger frameworks of social structure and
culture which constitute and reveal the place of law in society.” 74 In
this sense, we often relate legal culture to geographical or ethnical
boundaries (e.g., “Chinese legal culture” or “American legal
culture”), 75 to express the values held in society with regard to the
legal system.
The second notion of legal culture consists of “shared norms
and expectations produced by legal actors.” 76 Legal culture in this
sense is produced by “actors engaged in repeated interaction over
time,” 77 which often cross spatial boundaries. In this regard, lawyers
and arbitrators form an epistemic community—a community of
professionals with common training and expertise in the field of
international arbitration. As Ginsburg noted, “this common training
and expertise, combined with interactive practices, may gradually
produce a common set of expectations. These expectations, in turn,
shape behavior, though they are also subject to change as new norms
arise.” 78 In this second sense of culture, this paper attempts to foresee
whether the cross-national interactions in the arbitration community
will converge the participants’ own national legal cultures, and
eventually lead to the formation of an “international arbitration
culture.”

72

Tom Ginsburg, The Culture of Arbitration, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1336
(2003).
73
Id.
74
DAVID NELKEN, Towards a Sociology of Legal Adaptation, in Adapting Legal
Cultures 25 (DAVID NELKEN & JOHANNES FEEST eds., 2001).
75
One should bear in mind that there are often diverse cultures within a nation.
76
Ginsburg , supra note 72, at 1337.
77
Id.
78
Id.
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III.

Divergence Of Cultures And Localized Globalism:
A Country Study

In this section, we will examine the notion of culture in the
first sense. I will take a microscopic approach to map the extent of
conflicts and interactions between “indigenous” culture and
“transplanted” law through examples of China and Japan. Being the
second and the third largest economies in the world respectively, the
two countries will play an important role in the development of
arbitration in other parts of world. Both China and Japan are
classified as part of the “Far Eastern Legal Family.” 79 One of the
salient features of this group is the reliance on extra-judicial methods
of settling disputes. In their view, positive law imported from foreign
countries has not fully taken root in this group. 80 Deeply influenced
by the Confucian philosophy in pursuit of harmony, people resort to
informal procedures of dispute settlement instead of recourse to the
courts. 81
With that cultural tradition, the dispute resolution
mechanism in the two countries is viewed as a conciliatory mode,
contrasted to the adversary mode in the US. The contemporary
arbitration regimes of both jurisdictions based on the Western model
are at a relatively early stage of development. Authorities in both
jurisdictions have also undertaken significant reforms to improve
their arbitration legal framework in recent years. At the same time,
the two countries possess important divergences in their cultural,
legal tradition, legal transplant, and contemporary political, social
and economic status. The experience of China and Japan provide
case studies of how Western principles are adopted and adjusted with
their traditional dispute processing. The analysis in this section will
focus on the specific aspect of local preference for settlement as
compared to external (arbitral) decision. This may further shed light
on the interactions between the forces of legal globalization and the
forces of cultural diversity at a local level.

79
See, e.g., RENÉ DAVID & JOHN E. C. BRIERLEY, Major Legal Systems in the
World Today: An Introduction to the Comparative Study of Law (Free Press 2nd
ed. 1978); RENÉ DAVID, TRAITÉ ÉLÉMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL COMPARÉ
[Elementary Treatise on Comparative Civil law] (1950); HIROSHI ODA, JAPANESE
LAW (3rd ed. 2011); 1 KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, Introduction to
Comparative Law 431-34 (Tony Weir trans., 2nd ed. 1987).
80
ODA, supra note 79, at 5.
81
ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 79, at 362–65.
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To be sure, even within a country, there are diverse legal
cultures. For instance, the Islamic North West of China has a long
tradition of dispute resolution that is very different culturally from the
Han Chinese experience. The cultural dimensions may also vary by
the age, gender, educational background, occupation, etc. As Iino
expressed it, “each individual is by no means identical even within a
culture or speech community; each individual is multicultural in this
regard with an aggregate of multilayered comembership. No two
people share the same set of semantic categories of social identity.” 82
We should avoid allowing the cultural dimensions to become a
stereotype. In conducting the following country studies of China and
Japan, I am neither suggesting that cultures are agreed upon by all of
a society’s members, nor that culture is logical, coherent, uniform or
static.
A. Localization of Globalism in China
1.

Contemporary Features of Arbitration in China

One of the main features of contemporary Chinese arbitration
is frequent use of the combination of mediation with arbitration.83
Due to the divergent conceptions on the role of arbitrators in different
cultures, the appropriateness of arbitrators to facilitate settlement is
one of the most heatedly debated issues in international arbitration. 84
The opponents consider that the roles of a mediator and an arbitrator
are not compatible and cannot be assumed by the same person.
Mediation is a non-adjudicatory process, “in which a third-party
neutral, the mediator, assists disputing parties in reaching a mutually
agreeable resolution.” 85 Mediators are not decision-makers, and they
82

MASAKAZU IINO, A Trap of Generalization: A Case of Encountering a New
Culture, 9 Working Papers in Educational Linguistics 21, 38 (1993).
83
For a discussion, see KUN FAN, ARBITRATION IN CHINA: A LEGAL AND
CULTURAL ANALYSIS 155-69 (2013); Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler & Kun Fan,
Integrating Mediation into Arbitration: Why It Works In China?, 25 J. INT'L ARB.
479 (2008).
84
For a discussion, see Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, When Arbitrators Facilitate
Settlement: Towards a Transnational Standard, 25 ARB. INT'L 1897 (2009);
Emilia Onyema, The Use of Med-Arb in International Commercial Dispute
Resolution, 12 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 411, 415 (2001).
85
Kimberlee K. Kovach, Mediation, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
304 (Michael L. Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone eds., 2005).
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aim to facilitate information exchange, promote understanding
among the parties, and encourage the exploration of creative
solutions. Neither party is required to accept any proposal of the
mediator. 86 On the other hand, arbitration is an adjudicatory process
“by which a private third-party neutral, the arbitrator, renders a
binding determination of an issue in dispute.” 87 The line between the
two processes can be clearly drawn and cannot be combined.
In the Chinese practice, however, the boundary between the
two processes is somehow blurred. According to a series of
interviews with Chinese practitioners conducted by Professor
Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler and the author during a research trip in
March and April 2007, 88 the Chinese arbitrators systematically ask
the parties if they want to try mediation. If the parties agree, then he
will act as a mediator; if mediation fails, he will then shift his hat back
as an arbitrator and render a binding decision. This finding is
confirmed by a subsequent online survey conducted by the author in
November 2011 and April 2012. 89 88.9% of the respondents
86

See ROBERT BUSH & JOSEPH FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: THE
TRANSFORMATIVE APPROACH TO CONFLICT (2005); JAY FOLBERG & ALISON
TAYLOR, MEDIATION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO RESOLVING CONFLICTS
WITHOUT LITIGATION (1984); CHRISTOPHER MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS:
PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT (3rd ed. 2003).
87
Sarah Cole & Kristen Blankley, Arbitration, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE
RESOLUTION 318 (Michael L. Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone eds., 2005); JEANBAPTISTE-RENÉ ROBINET, DICTIONNAIRE UNIVERSEL DES SCIENCES MORALE,
ECONOMIQUE, POLITIQUE ET DIPLOMATIQUE 627 (1777).
88
The author conducted the research trip while working at the Geneva University
Law School on a research project about international arbitration in China.
Professor Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler directed the research project, and the Swiss
National Science Foundation funded it. The arbitrators interviewed were among
the most frequently appointed at the CIETAC, Beijing Arbitration Commission
(BAC) and Wuhan Arbitration Commission (WAC), who have extensive
experience in international arbitration in China. For the findings of this research
trip, see Kaufmann-Kohler & Fan, supra note 83, at 479-92.
89
Between November 2011 and April 2012, the questionnaires were distributed to
more than 100 Chinese arbitrators sitting on the panel of the CIETAC and the
BAC with the kind assistance of the CIETAC and the BAC and by the author’s
direct distribution to arbitrators by email. A total of thirty-eight responses were
received. After filtering out two incomplete responses, the analysis was based on
thirty-six complete responses. Statistically, 36 responses do not represent a very
large sample. It should be emphasized that the target of our survey was limited to
‘active’ arbitrators, who have actual arbitration experience. Counsel without the
experience of acting as arbitrators were excluded from the survey. Those who are
on the panel list but have never acted as arbitrators were also excluded. To put

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol11/iss2/2

2016]

“GLOCALIZATION” OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION

263

considered that it is appropriate for arbitrators to facilitate settlement.
In practice, a majority of the arbitrators have attempted mediation
during arbitration proceedings. 50% of the respondents have
proposed mediation to the parties in over 90% of the cases where they
act as arbitrators. The survey also shows that the Chinese arbitrators
consider the combination of mediation and arbitration as being
reflective of traditional culture. 90 When arbitrators propose the use
of mediation, the survey and the interview both show a wide range of
variation in the percentage of positive responses from both parties.
Generally, the percentage is higher when both parties are Chinese
than when a foreign party is involved. When both parties are Chinese,
the mean response is 54.65%, and the median is 59.50%. When a
foreign party is involved, the mean response is 37.50%, and the
median is 19.50%. 91
Why do Chinese arbitrators have a tendency to propose
mediation in arbitration proceedings? Why is the combination of
mediation and arbitration acceptable by the Chinese parties? How is
the imported concept of arbitration localized in the Chinese setting?
We will attempt to search for some explanations from the Chinese
legal tradition.
2.
1)

Tradition and Cultural Influence on Contemporary
Arbitration
Local Tradition

The non-adversarial method of dispute resolution is
considered to be one of the five themes of legal values underlying

this number into perspective, despite the large number of arbitrators on the panel
lists of arbitrators from numerous arbitration institutions, only a small portion are
frequently nominated by the parties or appointed by the arbitration institutions.
The reason is obvious: the arbitration is as good as the arbitrators. Parties,
advised by their lawyers, generally have their own list of active arbitrators who
they trust to have extensive experience and a good reputation. The same concern
applies when arbitration institutions are called upon to appoint arbitrators on the
parties’ behalf. The research findings were published in Kun Fan, An Empirical
Study on Arbitrators Facilitating Settlement in China, 15 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 777 (2014).
90
Id.
91
Id.; see also Kaufmann-Kohler & Fan, supra note 83, at 479-92
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both ancient and contemporary Chinese law and legal institutions.92
This tradition has a deeply embedded philosophical basis in China.
Various schools of thoughts, including Confucianism, Legalism and
Taoism, considered the pursuit of harmony paramount to maintaining
social stability. “Such a value system was gradually formed and
sustained by the agricultural ecology of traditional Chinese society
which was characterized by a high population density with relatively
low social mobility.” 93 With such a value system, the Chinese
generally preferred negotiation between two sides and mediation with
the assistance of a third party to reach a settlement. They relatively
disliked direct confrontation with each other and being judged by
third parties, as it symbolized disruption of harmony. This culture
has greatly influenced the development of dispute resolution
throughout China’s history.
With such a tradition, the concept of Western arbitration—
private law such as the jus civile in ancient Rome and the lex
mercatoria in medieval Europe cannot find root in Chinese soil.94
92

RANDLE EDWARDS ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 45-47
(1986).
93
Kwang-Kuo Huang, Guanxi and Mientze: Conflict Resolution in Chinese Society,
7 INTERCULTURAL COMM. STUD. 17, 22 (1997).
94
On the roots of Western arbitration, see THOMAS CLAY, L’ARBITRE [THE
ARBITRATOR] 1-10 (2001); ANGHELOS C. FOUSTOUCOS, L’ARBITRAGE-INTERNE
ET INTERNATIONAL EN DROIT PRIVÉ HÉLLÉNIQUE [DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION IN GREEK PRIVATE LAW] 3 (1978); OTTOARNDT GLOSSNER,
ARBITRATION - A GLANCE INTO HISTORY (1978); DOUGLAS MACDOWELL, THE
LAW IN CLASSSICAL ATHENS (1978); FRANCOIS DE MENTHON, LE RÔLE DE
L’ARBITRAGE DANS L’ÉVOLUTION JUDICIAIRE [THE Role of Arbitration in Judicial
Evolution] (1926); DERECK ROEBUCK, ANCIENT GREEK ARBITRATION (2001);
DERECK ROEBUCK, EARLY ENGLISH ARBITRATION (2008); DERECK ROEBUCK,
DISPUTES AND DIFFERENCES: COMPARISONS IN LAW, LANGUAGE AND HISTORY
(2010); DERECK ROEBUCK, THE CHARITABLE ARBITRATOR: HOW TO MEDIATE AND
ARBITRATE IN LOUIS XIV’S FRANCE (2002); DERECK ROEBUCK & BRUNO DE
LOYNES DE FUMICHON, ROMAN ARBITRATION (2004); Jean-Jacques Clère,
L’Arbitrage Révolutionnaire (Revolutionary Arbitration), 1 REVUE DE
L’ARBITRAGE [ARB. REV.] 3 (1981); Serge Dauchy, Le Recours Contre les
Sentences Arbitrales en Perspective Historique [Historical Perspective on
Remedies Against Arbitral Judgments] 4 REVUE DE L’ARBITRAGE [ARB. REV.] 763
(1999); René David, Arbitrage du XIXe et arbitrage du XXe siècle [Arbitration in
the 19th and 20th Centuries], in MÉLANGES OFFERTS À RENÉ SAVATIER [SELECTION
DEDICATED TO RENÉ SAVATIER] (1965); René David, Arbitrage et droit Comparé
[Arbitration and Comparative Law], 11 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT
COMPARÉ [INT’L REV. COMP. L.] 5 (1959); Jean Hilaire, L’arbitrage dans la
période moderne (XVIe-XVIIIe siècle) [Arbitration in the Modern Period (16th-18th
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Eve when the term “arbitration” was used in China, it was, in fact, a
method of internal resolution within the social institutions, rather than
a semi-formal institution to resolve disputes by a binding decision
made by a neutral third party.
It is important to bear in mind that due to the influence of
Confucian cultural tradition, the Chinese conceptualization of an
“individual” is very different from that of Western people. As a
cultural product of Christianity, the self-contained individualism of
Western civilization encourages an individual to define the boundary
between one and other by the immediate surface surrounding one’s
physical body. 95 The Chinese vision of “self,” on the other hand, is
a kind of interdependent self, which is defined by one’s social role
and relationship. 96 An individual’s “social self” is embedded in a
stable social network; the boundary of which may include other social
members. 97 In the process of socialization, the Chinese emphasize

Centuries)], 2 REVUE DE L’ARBITRAGE [ARB. REV.] 187 (2000); CHARLES
JARROSSON, LA NOTION D’ARBITRAGE [THE CONCEPT OF ARBITRATION] 1-25
(1987); Yves Jeanclos, La Pratique de l’Arbitrage du XIIe au XVe Siècle: Eléments
d’Analyse [Arbitration Practices of the 12th and 15th Centuries: Analytical
Elements], 3 REVUE DE L’ARBITRAGE [ARB. REV.] 417 (1999); Sophie Lafont,
L’arbitrage en Mésopotamie [Arbitraion in Mesopotamia], 4 REVUE DE
L’ARBITRAGE [ARB. REV.] 557 (2000); Fabrizio Marrella, L’arbitrage à Venise
(XIIe-XVIe siècles) [Arbitration in Venice (12th-16th Centuries)], 2 REVUE DE
L’ARBITRAGE [ARB. REV.] 263 (2000); Michael Mustill, Arbitration: History and
Background, 6 J. INT'L ARB. 43 (1989); Derek Roebuck, Best to Reconcile:
Mediation and Arbitration in the Ancient Greek World, 66 ARB. 275 (2000); Jean
Jean-François Poudret, Deux Aspects de l’Arbitrage dans les Pays Romands au
Moyen Âge [Two Aspects of Arbitration in Middle Ages French-Speaking Regions],
1 REVUE DE L’ARBITRAGE [ARB. REV.] 3 (1999); William K. Slate, The Impact of
Culture on International Commercial Arbitration, in NEW HORIZONS IN
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND BEYOND (2005); Julie
Velissaropoulos-Karakostas, L’arbitrage dans la Grèce antique [Arbitration in
Ancient Greece], 1 REVUE DE L’ARBITRAGE [ARB. REV.] 9 (2000).
95
See generally Edward Sampson, The Debate on Individualism: Indigenous
Psychologies of the Individual and Their Role in Personal and Societal Functioning,
43 AM. PSYCHOL. 15 (1988); Edward Sampson, The Decentralization of Identity:
Toward a Revised Concept of Personal and Social Order, 40 AM. PSYCHOL. 1203
(1985).
96
See generally Hazel R. Markus & Shinobu Kitayama, Cultural and the Self:
Implications for Cognition, Emotion and Motivation, 98 PSYCHOL. REV. 224 (1991).
97
Huang, supra note 93, at 20.
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the importance of taking appropriate action at one’s position
embedded in one’s social network. 98
In line with such conceptualization, the basic unit in
traditional Chinese society was not the individual but the individual’s
social group. 99 The existing social institutions—the family, clan,
village, and guild—played a significant role in dispute resolution in
traditional Chinese society and frequently outweighed the role of the
formal courts of law. 100 A family dispute would probably be settled
within the family by the family head. A dispute within the clan would
be resolved by the clan leaders. Village disputes would be resolved
by kinsmen, friends, neighbors, the gentry, other respected village
personalities, and even by the government-appointed headmen.
Disputes within the guilds would be handled by the guild officers.
Local groups actively encouraged, and in the case of clans and guilds,
required the parties to exhaust their remedies within the group before
looking to the magistrate for relief.
Upon a closer examination of the practice of resolving
disputes within the social groups based on the rules within the
families, clans, villages, and guilds, which guided the conduct of their
members and relevant anthropological studies, 101 we can see that the

98

Markus & Kitayama, supra note 96.
See, e.g., HSIEN CHIN HU, THE COMMON DESCENT GROUP IN CHINA AND ITS
FUNCTIONS (1948); Jerome Cohen, Chinese Mediation on the Eve of Modernization,
54 CAL. L. REV. 1201, 1207 (1966); Hui-Chen Wang Liu, An Analysis of Chinese
Clan Rules: Confucian Theories in Action, in CONFUCIANISM IN ACTION 63 (D.S.
Divison & A.F.Wright eds., 1959); Stanley Lubman, Mao and Mediation: Politics
and Dispute Resolution in Communist China, 55 CAL. L. REV. 1284, 1294 (1967).
100
See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 99; Lubman, supra note 99, at 1294-95.
101
See, e.g., MAURICE FREEDMAN, LINEAGE ORGANIZATION IN SOUTHEASTERN
CHINA (1958); KUNG-CHUAN HSIAO, COMPROMISE IN IMPERIAL CHINA (1979);
HUI-CHEN WANG LIU, THE TRADITIONAL CHINESE CLAN RULES (1959); BURTON
PASTERNAK, KINSHIP AND COMMUNITY IN TWO CHINESE VILLAGES (1972); QU
TONGZU (瞿同祖), ZHONGGUO FALÜ YU ZHONGGUO SHEHUI (中国法律与中国
社会) [Chinese Law and Chinese Society] (1981); Hu, supra note 99; Liu, supra
note 99; Geoffrey MacCormack, Assistance in Conflict Resolution: Imperial
China, in ASSITANCE IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION 116 (1996); L. Cohen Myron,
Lineage Organization in North China, 49 J. OF ASIAN STUD. 509 (1990); Jack
Potter, Land and Lineage in Traditional China, in FAMILY AND KINSHIP IN
CHINESE SOCIETY 121 (Maurice Freedman ed. 1970); Harriet T. Zurndorfer,
Learning, Lineages, and Locality in Late Imperial China. A Comparative Study of
Education in Huichow (Anhwei) and Foochow (Fukien) 1600-1800 Part 1, 35 J.
OF THE ECON. AND SOC. HIST. OF THE ORIENT 109 (1992); Harriet T. Zurndorfer,
99
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notions of mediation and arbitration were not clearly distinguished in
China. In fact, the function of the dispute resolver in traditional
Chinese society (family heads, clan heads, village leaders, guild
leaders, or other elders) was neither equivalent to the role of a
mediator nor that of an arbitrator was defined in the Western context.
Sometimes their role resembled that of an arbitrator, who heard the
arguments of the parties, looked into the evidence, and then handed
down a decision. Although not directly enforceable as a judgment,
such decisions were often respected by the disputing parties, as it was
considered dishonorable to disobey the elders. In the closely-knit
context of social life, social pressure largely supplanted legal
coercion as a method of settling disputes. Before the dispute reached
the stage of decision-making, however, the dispute resolver often first
adopted a conciliatory role and suggested ways in which the
disputants could come to a compromise or suggested possible
solutions satisfactory to both disputing parties. In that sense, their role
may be comparable to that of a mediator who assists the parties to
arrive at a satisfactory settlement. 102 The line between mediation and
arbitration was historically blurred in Chinese minds.
2)

Legal Transplant

The introduction of Western civilization into China during the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries resulted in significant changes in
the political, economic and cultural structures in Chinese society.
The pre-existing social order was destroyed by several major political
upheavals, and the legal tradition that was part of that social order
was greatly challenged by the new values, ideologies, and norms
imported from the West. The new legal system in China is shaped by
often divergent models drawn from China’s historical experience on
the one hand and by models based on the experience of Western
countries and the newly industrialized nations of Asia on the other
hand. How did the blurring of the notions of mediation and
arbitration affect the transplantation of arbitration and its subsequent
Local Lineages and Local Development: A Case Study of the Fan Lineage, Hsiuning 'Hsien' Hui-chou 800-1500, 70 T'OUNG PAO 18 (1984).
102
For a detailed discussion on the conceptual difference between arbitration and
mediation in China and in the West, see Kun Fan, Glocalisation of Arbitration:
Transnational Standards Struggling with Local Norms, 18 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV.
175 (2013).
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development in China? To address these questions, we need to trace
the history of the transplantation of arbitration in China.
The Western model of arbitration was imported into China in
the late Qing and early Republican period, shortly after the chamber
of commerce was introduced in 1904. However, when the Western
notion of “arbitration” was imported to China, there was much
discussion on the use of terminology.
The chambers of commerce proposed to adopt the term
“adjudication” (caipan). In 1907, the first institution established by
the Chengdu Chamber of Commerce was named the “commercial
adjudicatory institute” (shangshi caipansuo). 103 This proposal,
however, was rejected by the Ministry of Justice, as they were
suspicious of the establishment of an independent body which could
exercise an adjudicatory function outside state courts.
The
government suggested, or indeed insisted, on the adoption of the term
“arbitration” (gongduan), in order to distinguish the power of these
institutions from judicial courts.
An important limitation was
imposed on their scope of authority: the decisions rendered by these
commercial bodies would not be binding unless both parties accepted
it. In 1909, the institutions established under the Chongqing and
Baoding Chambers of Chambers adopted the name “commercial
arbitral body” (shangshi gongduanchu). Since then, other newly
established bodies under the chambers of commerce consistently
used the term “commercial arbitral body.”
In the transplantation process, we can see that the borrowed
concept was severely challenged by the Chinese native legal culture.
The extra-judicial nature of arbitration—a semi-formal institution
with an adjudicatory function producing a binding result—was
incompatible with Chinese local cultures. Adjudicatory functions
were reserved for the state courts. The notion of private justice was
historically foreign to the Chinese mind. Thus, the relevant
authorities in the Qing government were reluctant to recognize an
important feature of arbitration—the adjudicatory function and the
finality of the result. The transplanted institutions (so-called
“commercial arbitral bodies”) were transformed to mirror local
traditions, in that they did not have adjudicatory functions and their
103

Sichuan Chengdu Shanghui Shangshi Caipansuo Guize (四川成都商会商事裁
判所规则) [Rules of the Commercial Adjudicatory Institute of Sichuan Chengdu
Chamber of Commerce], 17 HUASHANG LIANHE BAO HAINEIWAI GONGDU (华商
联合报海内外公牍) [UNITED J. CHINESE MERCHANTS] 1 (1910).
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decisions were not binding unless both parties accepted. 104 The
binding effects of the arbitral decision were finally recognized in
1923 in the Arbitration Act. 105 This process demonstrates how
transplanted institutions are brought into harmony with local
traditions. In the constant struggle between borrowed concept and
local culture, the concept of arbitration was translated in its native
language, which differed from its original meaning. As a result of
this “cultural translation,” the native tradition of mediation was
integrated into the Western notion of arbitration. A new form of
institution or process gradually came into being—the integration of
mediation into arbitration.
One may argue that the popularity of mediation in arbitration
proceedings in China today is attributable to the top-down political
campaign to promote mediation as the key to resolving all disputes in
line with the Party’s “harmonious society” political doctrine. Since
2003, after two decades of the civil justice reform emphasizing law,
litigation and courts as institutions for resolving civil grievances in
the 1980s-1990s, the courts carried out a campaign emphasizing
shifting its priority from judiciary to mediatory justice. 106 The Party’s
policy of emphasizing mediation is implemented at courts of all levels
through the judicial target responsibility system, under which the
mediation ratio is linked with the judges’ salary and career rewards.
As a result, an increasing number of cases accepted by the courts are
settled rather than adjudicated. 107 Scholars argued that the revival of
104
For a detailed discussion on the transplantation process of arbitration in China
and the complex interplay between the state actors and non-state actors in
conceptualizing the borrowed institution, see Fan, supra note 102.
105
Gongduanfa Caoan (公断法草案) [Draft Arbitration Act], art. 21, 1926 FALÜ
CAOAN HUIBIAN (法律草案汇编) [LIST OF DRAFT LAWS] (1926) (China).
106
Hualing Fu & Richard Cullen, From Mediatory to Adjudicatory Justice: The
Limits of Civil Justice Reform in China, in CHINESE JUSTICE: CIVIL DISPUTE
RESOLUTION IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA at 25-57 (Cambridge,
Cambridge,University Press, 2011); Carl Minzner, China's Turn Against Law, 59
AM. J. OF COMP. L. 935, 939 (2011).
107
See, for instance, Fu & Cullen, id. The courts’ policy on mediation started to
get more balanced when Zhou Qiang took office in March 2013 as the President
of the Supreme People’s Court. In August 2013, Zhou Qiang made a public
speech to point out the defects of overemphasis on settlement rate and completion
rate in the past years. On October 29, 2013 the Supreme People’s Court released
Several Opinions Regarding the Actual Practice of Justice for the People,
Vigorously Strengthening a Fair Judiciary and Continuously Increasing Judicial
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mediation in the Chinese judiciary system was a result of the partystate commitment to a “socialist harmonious society,” 108 the top-down
authoritarian response motivated by social stability concerns, 109 the
“state channeling of social grievances,” 110 and “an exercise of state
power by local bureaucrats under the guise of tradition.” 111
While the above top-down authoritarian campaign may
explain the revival of mediation in Chinese courts today, the political
incentive of the judges cannot explain the arbitrators’ tendency to
mediate in China. Arbitrators are not hired by the states, but are
selected by the parties, either by direct nomination, or by indirect
appointment through one of the arbitration institutions that the parties
have chosen on an ad hoc basis. The arbitrators’ mandate will
terminate once an arbitral award is rendered. The arbitrators’ fees are
generally determined according to the fee scale of a chosen arbitration
institution. Different from judges, arbitrators do not have any salary
or career rewards linked to the mediation ratio. Indeed, the arbitrators
are generally paid less if the parties reach a settlement and withdraw
the arbitration proceeding than if the matter results in a final award. 112
Nevertheless, Chinese arbitrators still tend to play an active role in
promoting mediation in arbitration proceedings.
Psychologists have increasingly recognized the important role
that culture and cultural values have in shaping conflict and conflict
resolution. 113 Culture may offer an explanation for the wide use of
mediation in arbitration proceedings in today’s China. As discussed
Credibility, which emphasized the need to correctly handle the relationship
between mediation and adjudication, and to adequately advance the functions and
values of the two options.
108
Michael Palmer, Compromising Courts and Harmonizing Ideologies:
Mediation in the Administrative Chambers of the People’s Courts in the People’s
Republic of China, in NEW COURTS IN ASIA 251 (Andrew Harding & Penelope
Nicholson eds., 2009).
109
Minzer, supra note 106.
110
Haitian Lu, State Channeling of Social Grievances: Theory and Evidence from
China, 41 H. K. L. J. 231, 232 (2011).
111
Hualing Fu, The Politics of Mediation in a Chinese Country: The Case of Luo
Lianxi, 5 AUSTRALIAN J. OF ASIAN L. 107 (2003).
112
See, for instance, Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter, Law and Practice of
International Commercial Arbitration, 268-276 (London, Thomson Sweet &
Maxwell, 2004)
113
Tom Tyler and E Lind, Cultural Values and Authority Relations : The
Psychology of Resolution Across Cultures 6 Psychology, Public Policy, and Law
4 (2000) at 1138.
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earlier, the local tradition blurs the line between mediation and
arbitration. The family heads, clan heads, village leaders, guild
officials, or other dispute resolvers often attempted to facilitate the
parties to settle their disputes with a result satisfactory to both. If a
settlement was not reached, the same person would play a more
authoritative role and render a decision. As a result, Chinese parties
may be more ready to accept an arbitrator acting as a mediator and
less concerned about due process and natural justice objections raised
by the opponents of the combination. 114 The imported concept of
arbitration has been given a Chinese face—the combination of
mediation and arbitration. To use a metaphor, it is like grafting an
apple branch to a pear root stock. The grafted fruit tree produces both
pears and apples.
The Chinese experience also illustrates the Kahn-Freund
theory of legal transplant to a great extent, in the sense that laws must
not be separated from their purpose or from the circumstances in
which they are made. 115 This is in contrast to Watson’s theory of legal
transplant, according to which law is largely autonomous, with a life
of its own, and therefore rules or institutions are readily
transplantable from one system to another. 116 When law and legal
institutions of a society are transplanted into another society, there
will be a constant struggle between the imported rules, institutions,
and ideas and the deeply embedded local culture. As a result, the
114
The due process objection is that during the private meetings (caucuses) of the
mediation phase, information communicated confidentially to the mediator is not
known to the opposing party, and it is not subject to response or clarification by
the opposing party. As a result, the other party may be deprived of its due process
right to rebut those facts. Another objection is the fear that, in the event that the
settlement fails and the arbitration continues, the impartiality of the mediatorturned-arbitrator may be affected because of confidential information he or she
obtained during the mediation phase and which is not part of the record. See, Fan,
supra, note 102, at 142-44; Kaufmann-Kohler, supra, note 84.
115
Kahn-Freund argues, “we cannot take for granted that rules or institutions are
transplantable” and believes that “there are degrees of transferability.” See Otto
Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. REV. 1, 6,
27 (1974).
116
See Alan Watson, Aspects of Reception of Law, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 335
(1996); Alan Watson, From Legal Transplants to Legal Formants, 43 AM. J.
COMP. L. 469 (1995); Alan Watson, The Evolution of Law, 5 LAW & HIST. REV.
537 (1987); Alan Watson, Legal Change: Sources of Law and Legal Culture, 131
U. PA. L. REV. 1121 (1983); ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS (1974).
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emerging new form of mediation-arbitration retains some features of
traditional means of dispute resolution, but also features foreign ideas.
Local culture continues to have a significant role in the process of
China’s legal modernization. This cultural element represents a
powerful force that will influence the development of transnational
arbitration, in parallel with the forces of globalization.
B. Localization of Globalism in Japan
Having illustrated the localization of globalism through the
Chinese example, we will now move to another important economy
in East Asia—Japan. What can we learn from the Japanese
experience?
1.

Contemporary Features of Arbitration in Japan

In the wave of globalization, Japan has abolished its old law
of 1890 and adopted the new Arbitration Law in 2003 to reflect the
principles of the Model Law. 117 Japanese courts are generally proarbitration. There is also strong institutional support from the Japan
Commercial Arbitration Association (JCAA) to promote arbitration.
Despite the seemingly strong legal and institutional support for
arbitration, arbitration has not taken off in Japan as one would expect.
The JCAA’s caseload has not grown significantly since the new
Arbitration Law was put in place, with an average of 21 cases
annually from 2010 to 2014, 118 contrasted to an average of 290 cases
per year at the Korean Commercial Arbitration Board (KCAB) and
an average of 1,343 cases a year at the China International Economic
and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC). 119 While the JCAA
caseload has increased slowly compared to the situation a decade ago,
it has not kept pace with the growth at other arbitration institutions.
117

For a commentary on the new Arbitration Law, see Tatsuya Nakamura, Salient
Features of the New Japanese Arbitration Law Based Upon the UNCITRAL
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 17 JCAA Newsletter
(2004) (describing Japan's adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law); Luke
Nottage, Japan's New Arbitration Law: Domestication Reinforcing
Internationalisation?, 7 INT'L ARB. L. REV. 54 (2004); .
118
The annual caseloads at the JCAA are 27, 19, 19, 26 and 14 from 2010 to
2014. Information provided by the JCAA in an email dated 31 August 2015.
119
Data extracted from the official website of the CIETAC and KCAB annual
reports.
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To be sure, the low levels of arbitration activity in Japan are
insufficient to indicate that Japanese dislike international commercial
arbitration. Empirical evidence suggests that Japanese companies
have similar preferences with respect to international arbitration as
foreign companies. 120 The majority of Japanese companies surveyed
(66%) typically include arbitration clauses in their international
contract one or more times, more so than any other dispute resolution
mechanism (only 27% include provisions subjecting a prospective
dispute to international litigation). 121 This figure is higher than the
attitudes of corporations with long time experience in international
arbitration, from Europe, North America, Central and South America,
Asia and Pacific and Africa according to the survey conducted by
PricewaterhouseCoopers and Queen Mary University School of
International Arbitration (‘PWC & QML Report 2008’) showing that
44% of the participating corporations mostly used international
arbitration while 41% mostly used transnational litigation. 122 The
popularity of arbitration has increased over the years. In a later survey
conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers and Queen Mary University
School of International Arbitration in 2013 (‘PWC & QML Report
2013’), where respondents were general counsel, heads of legal
departments from worldwide, 52% of the respondents ranked
arbitration first as their order of preference, compared with 28% of
the respondents that chose court litigation as their first choice. 123
However, it is important to note that a preference for
arbitration as the default dispute resolution mechanism does not
necessarily mean that arbitration will be used to ultimately resolve
120
In order to investigate the Japanese corporations’ attitudes and practices
towards international arbitration, two surveys were conducted by the JCAA in
2007: one based on a total of 296 responses of Japanese companies in Japan and
another based on a total of fifty-seven responses from Japanese subsidiaries in
Europe. For an analysis of the surveys, see Michael Allan Richter, Attitudes and
Practices of Japanese Companies with Respect to International Commercial
Arbitration: Testing Perceptions with Empirical Evidence, 5 TRANSNAT'L DISP.
MGMT. 8 (2011).
121
Id., at 13.
122
International Arbitration: Corporate Attitudes and Practices,(2008),
http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/docs/123294.pdf (last visited Feb 27, 2016).
123
2013 Corporate Choices in International Arbitration: Industry Perspectives,
available at http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/research/2013/index.html (last
visited 19 April 2016).
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disputes. In fact, the survey shows that Japanese companies typically
resolve approximately 83% of all their international commercial
disputes by negotiated settlement. This observation is further
confirmed by an empirical research the author conducted in February
2016, when she interviewed a number of corporate counsels working
in Japan. Some corporate counsel explained the different cultural
attitudes towards arbitration as follows: the Japanese corporations
generally try to negotiate very hard before they file any claims for
arbitration, and as a result, we see a relatively low settlement rate in
arbitration cases involving Japanese parties. In contrast, the US
companies often file an arbitration as a strategy in order to push the
other side to negotiate seriously, and a number of arbitration cases are
indeed settled before a final award is rendered. 124
Even when the Japanese parties agree to incorporate an
arbitration clause in the contract and decide to start an arbitration
proceeding when a dispute arises, they still tend to structure
arbitration in a conciliatory fashion. Hattori, one of the directors of
the JCAA, noted that it still appeared to be usual for the arbitral
tribunal to recommend settlement to parties after completion of the
examination of witnesses and evidence and, with the parties’ consent,
the JCAA will provide mediation or conciliation for settlement
negotiations. 125 According to the author’s interview with the
Secretary General and a Case Manager of the JCAA, in roughly 2025% of the total cases, arbitrators act as mediators to facilitate
settlement in the JCAA arbitration proceedings. 126 In terms of the
parties’ attitude, the Japanese parties easily accept the same person
acting as both a mediator and an arbitrator. Some empirical research
also shows that most Japanese practitioners (76%) felt that the
arbitrators’ suggestion of settlement was in general appropriate. The
124
The author conducted a research trip in Kyoto and Kobe in February 2016, for
a research project about “Comparative Study of Arbitration in Japan and China:
Implications for the Development of Transnational Arbitration”. The author is the
Principal Investigator of the research project, and the Sumitomo Foundation
funded it.
125
Yasunobu Sato, COMMERCIAL DISPUTE PROCESSING AND JAPAN 258 (Kluwer
Law International, 2001).
126
Interview with Mr. Tatsuya Nakamura, Secretary General of the JCAA, and
Mr. Toshiyuki Nishimura, case manager JCAA, on 24 August 2015, for a
research project about “Comparative Study of Arbitration in Japan and China:
Implications for the Development of Transnational Arbitration”. The author is the
Principal Investigator of the research project, and the Sumitomo Foundation
funded it.
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figure is higher with domestic practitioners, i.e. in-house counsel for
companies, scholars and bengoshi (lawyers) (85%) than with
international practitioners, i.e. members of JCAA and the Japan
Shipping Exchange (JSE) (65%). Similarly, a total of 74% of
Japanese practitioners (85% of domestic practitioners, 65% of
international practitioners) consider that it is appropriate for the
arbitrators to conduct conciliation with the parties’ consent. 127
According to the JCAA, because Japanese judges frequently act as
mediators in the court proceedings, the Japanese parties are
accustomed to have the same person acting as a settlement facilitator
and a decision maker. 128
Why is arbitration still inactive in Japan despite its proarbitration structure? Why is there a preference over mediation even
when arbitration is initiated? Can we find some explanation from
Japanese legal culture?
1.
1)

Tradition and Cultural Influence on Contemporary
Arbitration
Local Tradition

Japanese history features a strong cultural continuity and the
ability to adapt imported culture and technology to the traditional
culture. 129 The homogeneity of its population is one critical
characteristic of Japanese culture. 130 Japan has a long tradition of
seeing a statement of morals in law, and the government has long
always used the law for the purpose of moral education. 131 Relatively
127
SATO (2001), supra note 124., at 341-42 (displaying results of a survey on the
linkage of arbitration and mediation, conducted in June–July 1999 with members
of JCAA and the Japan Shipping Exchange (JSE), in-house counsel for
companies, scholars and bengoshi (lawyers)). Due to a limited sample size, issues
concerning the quality of its methodology, and the age of the survey, this survey
does not provide conclusive evidence. However, as the number of arbitration
practitioners is still small in Japan, and almost all of the leading figures replied,
this survey still illustrates general attitudes in Japan. Id., at 319 n. 125.
128
Supra note126..
129
Fred E. Jandt, An Introduction to Intercultural Communication-Identities in a
Global Community, at 169 (Sage Publications, 2010).
130
Id., at 172.
131
Arthur Taylor von Mehren, The Legal Order in Japan's Changing Society:
Some Observations, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1174 (1963) (noting that the
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little reliance is placed on the formal legal order as an agency for
resolving disputes. 132
In Japan’s Edo period (1603–1868), 80% of the population
lived in rural villages, which were often geographically isolated from
any large city. 133 As a result of this isolation, villages were
empowered to manage their own internal affairs, so long as the tax
was paid. 134 “Reinforced by the Confucian ethic’s insistence on
harmony in human relations, the prevalent values in traditional
Japanese society” emphasized the maintenance of the group at the
local village level, rather than the protection of individual rights. 135
As Kawashima notes, “Traditionally, the Japanese people prefer extra
judicial ,informal means of settling a controversy. Litigation
presupposes and admits the existence of disputes and leads to a
decision which makes clear who is right or wrong in accordance with
standards that are independent of the will of the disputants […]
Because of the resulting disorganisation of traditional social groups,
resort to litigation has been condemned as morally wrong, subversive
and rebellious.” 136 Under this cultural tradition, the Japanese people
prefer extrajudicial, informal means of settling a controversy.
To be sure, Japan did have a sophisticated court system during
the Edo period. However, ordinary citizens were discouraged from
bringing lawsuits to court. Villagers generally were denied access to
the courts or police for enforcement of civil law, unless official
approval of the village’s headman was obtained. 137 Even if the
headman’s permission was obtained, there were further obstacles to
proceed with a formal litigation within the Japanese court system. 138
proposition that in traditional Japanese society very little reliance is placed on the
formal legal order was a frequently raised as a problem during the 1961 Harvard
Law School Conference on Japanese Law).
132
Id.
133
Dan F. Henderson, "Contracts" in Tokugawa Villages, 1 J. JAPANESE STUD.
51, 52 (1974).
134
Thomas Smith, The Japanese Village in the Seventeenth Century, 12 J. Econ.
Hist. 1 (1952) (discussing systems of peasant taxation in seventeenth century
Japan).
135
von Mehren, supra note 131.
136
Takeyoshi Kawashima, Dispute Resolution in Contemporary Japan, in Law in
Japan: The Legal Order in a Changing Society (ARTHUR TAYLOR VON
MEHREN ed. 1963), at 41-72.
137
Henderson, supra, note 132 at 62.
138
Tony Cole, Commercial Arbitration in Japan: Contributions to the Debate on
“Japanese Non-Litigiousness”, 40 N.Y.U. J. OF INT’L L. & POL. 29, 55 (2007).
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The court procedure was highly complex and strictly applied, and
“plaintiffs were subject to continual pressure to settle, including
repeated adjournments to facilitate negotiations.” 139
One interesting observation is that, different from the Chinese
aversion to the use of precise contract terms in transactions, historical
evidence indicates a full awareness on the part of ordinary Japanese
citizens of both the nature of their rights and their ability to enforce
them through clear contractual language. 140 Some studies show that
villagers in Japan typically put important agreements into formal
contracts, many of which were clearly written with the possibility of
future court enforcement in mind.141 This forms an important feature
of Japanese legal culture: non-confrontational dispute settlements
that do not take place in the context of a lack of formal contracts and
vague classifications of rights and obligations. Instead, Japanese
parties were fully aware of their individual rights protected by the law,
but preferred to negotiate instead of fight. In the traditional ways of
settling a dispute, the resolution was mostly reached through
agreements by both parties.
The notion that justice measured by universal standards can
exist independent of the wills of the disputants was alien to traditional
Japanese culture. 142 Within the communal system, techniques of
dispute resolution appropriate for controversies arising in an
individualist setting were not developed. 143 As in China, though the
term “arbitration” appeared in traditional Japanese society, it appears
today as “arbitrary conciliation” or “conciliatory arbitration” and is
used as a kind of reconcilement. 144 This blurring of the notions of
conciliation and arbitration in Japan can be vividly illustrated by a
scene in Sannin Kichisa Kuruwa no Hatsugai, a traditional Japanese
Kabuki play written by Kawatake Mokuami: a Buddhist priest named
Kissa, entrusted as an arbitrator by two gangsters both named Kissa,
resolved a dispute by using his wisdom to reached a consensus

139

Id. at 55-56.
Id. at 53.
141
See generally Henderson, supra note 132.
142
Kawashima (1963), supra note 135.
143
Mehren, supra note 131, at 1174.
144
SATO (2001), supra note 121., at 2.
140
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between the disputants. 145 The role of the arbitrator here is not just as
an adjudicator, but also a settlement facilitator. Kawashima portrays
this blurring of the notions of conciliation and arbitration in Japan as
follows:
In principle, the third person who intervenes to settle a dispute,
the go-between, is supposed to be a man of higher status than the
disputants. When such a person suggests conditions for
reconcilement, his prestige and authority ordinarily are sufficient to
persuade the two parties to accept the settlement. Consequently, in
the case of mediation also, the conditions for reconcilement which he
suggests are in a sense imposed, and the difference between
mediation and arbitration is nothing but a question of the degree of
the go-between’s power. Generally speaking, the higher the prestige
and the authority of the go-between, the stronger is the actual
influence on the parties in dispute, and in the same proportion
conciliation takes on the coloration of arbitration or of mediation. 146
In the process of establishing a modern civil justice system
modeled on German law and procedure, traditional conciliation was
institutionalized as kankai conciliation in 1876. 147 Kankai was
legitimized as a court procedure, resulting in its preferred usage prior
to a regular judicial proceeding modeled on the French system of
conciliation préliminaire. 148
It was abolished at the time of
enforcement of the Code of Civil Procedure in 1891. 149 During the
reform of civil procedure in the 1920s and 1930s, the government
reinstituted chōtei conciliation, which established a court-annexed
conciliation system. 150
2)

Legal Transplantation

Foreign law arrived in Japan in three different stages. 151 The
first stage was “in the seventh and eighth centuries when Japan
imported the Chinese political and legal system”. 152 The second stage
145
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was “in the process of industrialization after the overthrow of the
Tokugawa Shogunate in the late nineteenth century and the early
twentieth century”. 153 During this period, massive borrowing of
foreign law took place, “in part for purposes of reform, in part for
reasons of survival and national independence.” 154 Japanese law was
almost completely remade, drawing on Western (primarily French
and German) concepts and institutions, although these were given a
characteristically Japanese twist. The Japanese civil litigation system
drew heavily on Continental European—especially German—
models. 155 The third stage began after the Second World War and
continued during the period of the Allied Occupation. 156 There was
“conscious, and often more or less imposed, borrowing from the
American system,” 157 in particular the adversarial form of litigation
and the U.S. Constitution. Legal developments again merged a new
foreign input with purely Japanese attitudes and characteristics.
Throughout this extraordinary history of legal transplantation,
Japanese law has become a “hybrid” or “mixed” creature like the
Japanese lunch box (bentō)—the product of the struggle to adapt
foreign ideas to Japanese values and to adapt Japanese values to
ever-changing circumstances. What is the role of Japanese local
culture in the development of arbitration? This leads us to the history
of arbitration transplantation in Japan.
When the Western system of chambers of commerce was
imported into Japan in the early Meiji period, the arbitration of
disputes was included amongst their functions. 158 The Western
concept of arbitration was legitimized under Book VIII of the old
Code of Civil Procedure (CCP, Law No. 29 in 1890). The provisions
were almost a literal translation of the German Code of Civil
Procedure 1877. Book VII and VIII of the old CCP were renamed the
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Law on Procedure for General Publication Notice and Procedure for
Arbitration (Old Law).
However, the imported concept of arbitration—which is
confrontational and replaces the court trial with a private person’s
decision to finalize disputes, was incompatible with the native
Japanese culture of conciliation — a consensus and harmonyoriented process. Due to the absence of the concept of “private justice”
in Japanese culture, arbitration has not been well accepted by the
Japanese people, who believe that the final decision on disputes
should be monopolized by public authorities. Neither was the
transplanted institution favored by the Japanese authorities. As Sato
notes:
. . . throughout the modern history of Japan,
arbitration was not a priority of judicial policy. In
the process of modernizing the judiciary during and
after the Meiji modernization, priority was placed on
adjudicative dispute processing with modern laws by
the courts through establishing a unified modern
judicial court system for the promotion of capitalism.
The priority remained the same in the process of
post-war
democratization
and
economic
rehabilitation. 159
Consequently, despite the provisions of arbitration procedure
in the Old Law, it was seldom used in practice. Arbitration clauses
are normally not employed except in agreements with foreign
business firms. 160
Following the Meiji modernization and the post-war
democratization, Japan is now faced with a new wave of massive law
reforms—the wave of “globalization.” 161 This means that Japanese
business and commercial activities will inevitably result in more
cross-border commercial disputes. Globalization requires a new
system of commercial dispute resolution that reflects global standards
and calls for reforms of Japan’s outdated arbitration law. Japanese
authorities are beginning to see the importance of improving its
arbitration framework to build Japan into an attractive international
arbitration center. The reform of arbitration law was initiated in late
December 2001 by the Japanese government’s Office for Promotion
159
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of Justice System Reform (Shihō Seido Kaikaku Suishin Honbu). The
Reform Office set up a study group of experts on arbitration for
consideration of the new law and experts studied the law reform
based upon the Model Law. On March 14, 2003, the Reform Office
submitted a bill for the Arbitration Law of Japan (New Law) to the
Japanese National Diet, and the New Law was promulgated on
August 1, 2003. The New Law, promulgated as Law No. 138 of 2003,
is applicable both to national and international arbitrations. 162 It has
adopted the majority of the Model Law with some slight
modifications. 163 Nevertheless, arbitration remains inactive in Japan.
For decades, scholars have heatedly debated the reasons for
Japanese non-litigiousness. 164 The “culturalists” argue that the
reluctance of the Japanese to litigate can be attributed to the Japanese
culture’s emphasis on the need for harmony in social relations. 165 The
“institutionalists,” on the other hand, insist that Japan’s low litigation
rates is due to the structural impediments to litigation that are built
into the Japanese legal system such as the high costs of litigation, the
lack of lawyers and judges, the relative absence of discovery
procedures and the incredible amount of time required to obtain a
judicial resolution. 166 The institutionalists’ theory, led by Ramseyer,
presented a more comprehensive picture of the Japanese legal system,
and may offer a good explanation for the Japanese avoidance of
litigation. However, the question remains as to why there is a
similarly low usage of arbitration, which does not have such
structural barriers in the court system. Cole argues that Japan’s
continuing low rate of arbitration and litigation is best explained by
162
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the disjunction between the Japanese law and social rules rather than
institutional barriers. 167 According to this theory, “no formal dispute
resolution system will be widely used where it does not conform to
the social relations it is allegedly resolving”. 168
One such disjunction exists between arbitration as a
formalistic mechanism and the deeply rooted informal relational
traditions in Japan. As a result, even though the structural barrier is
lifted with Japan’s modernization of arbitration law and strong
institutional support, arbitration is still not widely used today. Even
when the Japanese parties agree to incorporate an arbitration clause
into their contract, they will first seek for a negotiated settlement
when a dispute actually arises. Even when the disputing parties
decide to start an arbitration proceeding, it is often filed with the aim
of provoking settlement negotiations, and mediation is often used
during an arbitration proceeding. Furthermore, as illustrated earlier,
the concepts of conciliation and arbitration were traditionally not so
distinct in Japan. Such a blurring in notion remains in the Japanese
minds. For instance, Kōjien, one of the most popular Japanese
dictionaries, states that “conciliation means arbitration” in daily
use. 169 Arbitration is understood to be closer to conciliation than
litigation in Japanese culture. Consequently, the same person
assuming the role of a mediator, and later the role of an arbitrator is
also culturally acceptable by the Japanese arbitrators and parties.
The Japanese experience shows how the imported civil justice
system was adapted to accord closely with local culture. During the
Japanese modernization process, “the conciliation culture played the
role of conduit for the Western principle of the rule of law to Japanese
society, and acted as a buffer or cushion for conflicts between modern
law and traditional values.” 170 It also confirms our earlier observation
that the transplantation of laws and institutions from one country to
another is not viable without an adequate adaptation based on an
understanding of the indigenous culture and the local setting of the
receiver.
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C. Summary of the Localized Globalism
A curious phenomenon in the above case study is the sharp
contrast between the drastic growth of arbitration in China and the
continued inactiveness of arbitration in Japan today. The different
attitudes towards arbitration in the two countries seem to indicate that
local cultures have reacted to the transplanted institution differently.
Japanese culture is like a sponge—it absorbs what is compatible with
the local culture, and rejects what is not compatible. Arbitration, as
a formalistic mechanism, seems to be incompatible with the deeply
rooted informal relational traditions in Japan, and is thus still not
widely accepted by the Japanese people. Chinese culture is more
prepared to absorb a foreign concept, but interprets it with something
that they are familiar with. 171 As a result of this cultural translation,
the local elements are incorporated into the borrowed norms. Thus,
although the Western concept of arbitration was initially rejected by
the local authorities during the transplantation process, it
subsequently developed in China but was injected with local elements.
The case of Japan and China proves that legal homogenization
and universalism are only some of the possible outcomes of legal
globalization. Resistance, hybridity and indifference are also entirely
legitimate possibilities. 172 Japan offers an example of selection,
rejection and hybridity while China is an example of resistance,
adaptation, and hybridity in the process of legal transplant.
To summarize, the above analysis demonstrates two points.
First, powerful forces of globalization have succeeded in achieving a
high level of global participation in arbitration and the harmonization
of arbitration laws and institutional rules. Second, there are also
strong forces of cultural diversity, which have led to the divergences
in the concept and conduct of arbitration. 173 Through the influence of
these two forces, the transplanted institution was repackaged to fit
local norms, combining concepts and processes from both mediation
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and arbitration. Global processes are incorporated into the local
setting—a phenomenon we will describe as “localized globalism.” 174
IV.

Diffusion Of Cultures And Globalized Localism

The concept of legal culture I have discussed so far is in its
first sense—those aspects of national culture that find expression in
the legal system. I will now look at legal culture in its second sense,
consisting of “shared norms and expectations produced by legal
actors.” 175 From this perspective, I will discuss the prospects of the
emergence of a common international arbitration culture, crossing
national and geographical boundaries—the “diffusion of cultures.”
At the present stage, no global law or procedure has been
realized, despite the trends of harmonization in the wave of
globalization. There are still a number of different arbitral practices
associated with divergent legal cultures. International arbitration has
not yet been able to bridge the cultural gaps between Western and
non-Western legal norms, the conflicts between foreign and
indigenous cultures, and differences in legal tradition between civil
law and common law countries. The very concept of arbitration is
often interpreted differently by different cultures.
Looking forward, will globalization and the cross-national
interactions in the arbitration community eventually drive to the
emergence of an international arbitration culture? From a normative
perspective, such a convergence may be desirable in light of the need
for predictability in cross-cultural dispute processing. The purpose
of international arbitration is to serve the global business community,
not just regional or national interests. 176 The question is how this
convergence might occur. What are the forces that may lead to the
emergence a culture of arbitration, common to practitioners,
arbitrators and parties involved in arbitral practice?
Dezalay and Garth argue that one such force is the “symbolic
capital”—“the social class, education, career, and expertise that is
contained within a person.” 177 Based on Bourdieu’s construct of a
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social field, 178 the authors explain the evolution of arbitration as a
competition among “the grand old men” and the large AngloAmerican law firms over the rules of the game. The success of the
competention depends on strength of their “symbolic capital,” in
other words, “on the recognition, institutionalized or not, that they
received from a group.” 179 Through these struggles based on
symbolic capital, arbitration has gradually moved from a small
number of “grand old men” to multinational law firms operating in a
global market. 180 The contested process the authors described may
produce the culture of arbitration.
Another driving force towards a common arbitration culture
is considered the practitioners’ “normative commitment to
establishing international arbitration as a global system of
governance for cross-border commercial relationships,” either for its
own sake or for the sake of serving the needs of the business
community. 181 Karton argues that,
[P]artly by self-selection, partly by internalization of
community norms, and partly out of a desire for
esteem from other members of the community, those
seeking to break into the upper echelons of
international arbitral practice will emulate the
résumés, practices, and perspectives of the current
elite, thus reinforcing existing values and
standards. 182
From an economic perspective, Ogus perceives legal culture
as a combination of procedures and concepts that “constitute a
‘network’ which, because of the commonality of usage, reduces the
costs of interactive behavior.” 183 According to Ogus, networks in
economics are systems in which users are linked, and network goods
178
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are those for which a user’s benefit increases as the number of
network users increases. 184 Examples of such “network goods”
include telephone, Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, Weibo among others.
They are useless for a user unless others also use them; the more
people own them, the more useful they become. Using Ogus’s theory,
Ginsburg describes the arbitration culture as a “network.” 185 He
claims that “the rapid spread of arbitration makes it more likely that
parties will be familiar with it as a dispute resolution option, creating
more business for arbitrators” and also the “demand for new rules and
intense competition to define the network.” 186 Consequently,
according to Ginsburg, we see “the spread and continuous updating
of arbitration rules to capture some of the ‘market’ for arbitral
business as well as to set the standard for future interactions” and
“practitioner-scholars competing with each other to establish and
influence the shape of the law.” 187
To better appreciate the cultural complexity of the modern
world, it may be useful to think of culture as a big “open system.” As
Yu Xingzhong notes:
Social practices interact and coordinate with each
other through several subsystems, including law,
economics, and morality. A change of the first
subsystem can lead to a change of the second, the
change of the second system can lead to a change of
the third, and the change of the third can in turn cause
a new change of the first subsystem through feedback
effects.
During this process, the subsystems
constantly interact with and adapt to each other and
the change is not linear. 188
Considering culture as an open system allows us to study its
interactions with subsystems such as law, economics, politics, and
history. The formation of an arbitration culture will be under the
influence of a variety of factors including law, politics, economy, and
184
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morality. But certain factors are affecting it more strongly than others.
As Taniguchi puts it, “national politics, which would dominantly
affect the national court system and even the domestic arbitration
system, would affect international commercial arbitration taking
place in the same country much less, if at all.” 189 International
commercial arbitration is developed by businessmen to resolve
conflicts between them. Economic factors may thus be more
influential than other factors.
From an economic perspective, arbitration is a service
industry, and evolves as part of competition within the “law
market.” 190 Parties that desire arbitration can choose the applicable
law, the seat of arbitration, and the arbitration institutions in their
contract. In order to attract international commerce, states endeavor
to implement arbitration-friendly laws and to commit the courts to
enforce the arbitration agreements and the resulting arbitral awards.
Arbitration institutions now compete worldwide for the business of
resolving international commercial disputes by modernizing their
arbitration rules, hiring professional arbitrators who have an
established reputation in the community, and by organizing
arbitration seminars and conferences to promote their services. Other
professional organizations (such as the Chartered Institute of
Arbitrators, International Council for Commercial Arbitration,
Center for Effective Dispute Resolution, and Institute of
Transnational Arbitration) organize various kinds of arbitration
conferences and provide professional training for arbitration
practitioners and arbitrators, to familiarize them with the rules of the
procedure. An increasing number of educational institutions have
developed a specialized master’s program on international
commercial arbitration, which also plays a role in forging the shared
norms of the arbitration community. As a result, an American lawyer,
a Chinese lawyer, and a Japanese lawyer, all having taken the
arbitration courses at one of the arbitration master’s programs, gone
through the arbitration training at one of the professional
organizations, and having worked in the arbitration practice group in
one of the multinational law firms, may indeed produce a common
set of expectations, norms, and behaviors. These shared norms and
189
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expectations will form a “legal culture” in the second sense of the
term. Driven by competition within the law market, different forms
of arbitration may slowly converge to form a common culture in the
international arbitration community—a phenomenon I describe as
“globalized localism.” 191
By acknowledging the powerful tendencies of “globalized
localism,” I do not assert that cultural diversity is destined to vanish.
Neither do I endorse the assumption that it is inevitable that law and
practice will converge around Western legal traditions as a result of
competition in the law market. On the contrary, much of the growth
of international commerce today is exclusively non-Western. A
notable example is the rise of China on the world stage as the nation
with the largest trade volume 192 and the second largest economy in
terms of GDP. 193 China is now the second largest FDI recipient
worldwide, and its outward FDI continues to grow, reaching a record
level of $84 billion in 2012. 194 Since 2009, China has become Africa's
largest trading partner surpassing the US, exchanging about $160
billion worth of goods a year. 195 Why should we assume that the
emergence of an international arbitration culture will predominantly
reflect Western values and dispute resolution styles? 196
Furthermore, the growth of worldwide non-Western mass
migration also casts doubt on the assumption of Westernization as a
result of convergence. 197 In the flat world of maps, sharp lines show
where one country ends and another begins. The real world, however,
191

Another form of globalized localism occurs when local traditions are directly
exported to the wider arbitration world. See generally, FAN, supra note 83.
192
China Eclipses U.S. as Biggest Trading Nation, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Feb. 10,
2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-02-09/china-passes-u-s-tobecome-the-world-s-biggest-trading-nation.
193
David Barboza, China Passes Japan as Second-Largest Economy, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 15, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/16/business/global/16yuan.html?pagewanted=a
ll&_r=1.
194
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment
Report 2013: Global Value Chains: Investment and Trade for Development, at
xiv, xvii, U.N. Sales No. E.13.II.D.5 (2013).
195
One Among Many, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 17, 2015,
http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21639554-china-hasbecome-big-africa-now-backlash-one-among-many.
196
This idea is drawn from the comments by Philip McConnaughay at the 2nd
Annual ITA Winter Forum, Miami, January 25, 2013.
197
Id.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol11/iss2/2

2016]

“GLOCALIZATION” OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION

289

is more fluid. Peoples do not have borders the way that parcels of land
do. They move from place to place; they wander; they migrate.
According to a report in The Economist, “more Chinese people live
outside mainland China than French people live in France, with some
to be found in almost every country. There are some 22 million ethnic
Indians scattered across every continent”. 198 It further reports that
“diasporas have been a part of the world for millennia. Today, they
are far bigger than they were.” 199 The world has 40% more firstgeneration migrations than in 1990. If migrants were a nation, they
would be the world’s fifth-largest”. 200 These “diasporan” nations that
cross national boundaries operate largely according to relational
principles, not according to the formalistic Western legal
mechanisms. 201
If the common arbitration culture is not destined to reflect
Western standards, what then will it look like? In fact, it has been
widely accepted by social scientists that “it is no longer possible to
assume that the world is divided up into discrete ‘societies,’ each with
its corresponding and well-integrated ‘culture’”. 202
Some
commentators have argued that “modernity is slowly giving way to a
new ‘postmodern’ framework characterized by a less stable sense of
identity and knowledge.” 203
Within this new “postmodern”
framework, what we might see is a diffusion of cultures around the
globe, bridging Western and non-Western differences.
Such processes of diffusion or hybridization have become
most visible in food, music, dance, film and language. Glocalized
food, glocalized language, glocalized music, glocalized marketing,
business and brand communication, glocalized medicine, and even
glocalized military defense are now part of our daily lives. 204
198
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McDonalds is a good example. It is a globally recognized brand, but
it responds to local tastes in developing its menu. So, you can buy
a McItaly burger, a Maharaja Mac in India, a McLobster in Canada,
and an Ebi Filet-O with Seaweed Shaker fries in Japan. Another
example is the Disneyland’s glocalization in Hong Kong. In response
to the initial failure when it opened in Hong Kong in 2005,
Disneyland made an effort to cater to the local Chinese taste by
reducing prices, adapting to local Chinese customs and labor
practices, and changing the decor and settings. Having successfully
glocalized its theme park in Hong Kong, Disneyland achieved great
success in park attendance and revenue growth. The fusion of rock
and hip hop, later known as “rap rock” 205 is also a result of the cultural
diffusion. The integration of mediation and arbitration into one single
proceeding is yet another illustration of this cultural diffusion—
“glocalization.”
V.

Conclusion And Further Study

To conclude, the development of arbitration is a hybrid
blended and creolized process of glocalization. On the one hand,
global norms are localized with adaptations to accord more closely
with local cultures—“localized globalism.” On the other hand,
through interactions with different cultures, local practices may
produce shared norms and expectations, and eventually form a
common culture—“globalized localism.” The future of international
arbitration will continue be influenced by the combined forces of
globalism and localism.
To be sure, this article is not suggesting that culture is the sole
or the prime determinant of behavior. Indeed, a variety of other
constraints act upon arbitrators and parties, such as economic selfinterest, personal political or moral beliefs. 206 It is impossible to
identify “direct causal relationships between specific social norms
and corresponding behaviors” or to “separate entirely the effects of
culture from other factors.” 207 Nevertheless, “the malleability
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surrounding the notion of ‘culture’ does not prevent the ascription of
determinative efficacy and the articulation of various characteristics
which can prove of direct relevance.” 208 The analysis and prediction
in this paper is only suggestive, not conclusive. It hopes to stimulate
idea on future study in legal culture, international arbitration, and
globalization.
The cultural analysis in this paper is also not free from the
danger of generalizations. However, “language itself is a product of
generalization—we cannot argue each time if a red round fruit in a
grocery store is really an apple with a shopkeeper.” 209 Generalization
is inevitable, but we may reduce the danger of generalization by
conscious effort. We should not assume that cultures are logically
consistent, highly integrated, consensual, static and clearly bounded,
as the classic ethnographic model of culture has assumed. Instead,
we should consider cultures as being “contradictory,” “loosely
integrated,” “contested,” “subject to constant change,” and “weakly
bounded.” 210 In the globalizing world of today, the boundaries of
cultures are becoming more porous and open-ended. As Sewell
noted: “whether we call these partially coherent landscapes the
meaning of ‘cultures’ of something else—worlds of meaning, or
ethnoscapes, or hegemonies—seems to me relatively unimportant so
long as we know that their boundedness is only relative and
constantly shifting.” 211
Furthermore, this study suggests that future scholarships go
beyond the conventional tradition-modernity, East-West model,
which places and retains Western traditions and practices as the
center and norm. This paper examines the experience in China and
Japan, and more work needs to be done to study the non-Western
traditions and their role in the diffusion of law and cultures, such as
other parts of Asia, Latin America, and Africa.
Finally, the proliferation of these “cosmopolitan institutions,”
such as the international arbitration discussed in this paper, may push
global legal scholars to find new definitions and methodologies to
approach globalization, and to move away from the exclusive
standpoint of legal norms to the standpoint of the actors themselves
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and their legal practices. More collaborative research is needed to
give international arbitration a solid conceptual backing, breaking
through conventional sub-disciplinary boundaries—legal history,
comparative law, jurisprudence, sociology of law, legal anthropology,
law and economics, and other areas of substantive interest.
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